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The global automotive industry is dominated by a few multinational 
corporations which design global and regional strategies. If regional 
strategies prevailed over global ones, the Southern Common Market 
(mercosur) could become a competitive export platform. This paper 
reviews the extent to which trade agreements covering the automotive 
industry in mercosur have helped the region develop into a platform for 
exports to the rest of the world. Bilateral trade data from 1991-2005 and 
gravity models are used to evaluate trade creation and export market 
diversification in the automotive industry. The results show that, as of 
2005, mercosur agreements had not turned the region into a platform 
for exports to external markets, although they had contributed to trade 
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Automotive production is dominated by a handful 
of multinational corporations. In 2005, the leading 
five (General Motors, DaimlerChrysler, Toyota, Ford 
and Volkswagen) accounted for 65% of total output. 
Subsidiaries of some of these firms began producing in 
Argentina and Brazil in the 1950s, motivated mainly by 
the growth in these countries’ domestic markets. These 
markets were highly protected, as the automotive markets 
of producing countries generally are.
However, new trends in the industry in the 
1990s weakened the role of domestic markets and the 
incentives for multinationals to continue expanding 
the production capacity of their subsidiaries. The trend 
now was to increase international competitiveness by 
internationalizing production, a strategy that was seen 
as effective both in cutting costs and at the same time 
in increasing product variety worldwide. In this context, 
protectionist policies ceased to be the best incentive 
for creating an internationally competitive automotive 
industry, as corporate strategies contained strong 
global elements that perpetuated the need for extensive 
international trade in both vehicles and parts within the 
corporation and with suppliers abroad.
The widespread adoption of global strategies by 
multinationals in the automotive sector ought to have 
created a “global car”, a car produced globally for 
global markets. The evidence seems to show, however, 
that automakers tend to make most of their sales in the 
regions where their headquarters are based and that they 
locate their subsidiaries strategically to capture markets 
in the vicinity of their production sites. These regional 
strategies are implemented simultaneously with global 
strategies, and may be said to complement them.
Section II examines these global and regional 
strategies in greater detail, confirming the findings of 
many authors (Freyssenet and Lung, 2000; Humphrey 
and Memedovic, 2003; Rugman and Collinson, 2004) 
to the effect that regional strategies in the automotive 
industry are more efficient and profitable than national 
or global ones. This offers encouraging prospects for 
mercosur, as it could potentially be a production and 
export platform for an internationally competitive industry.
Integration between the mercosur members 
(Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) has not yet been 
fully achieved for the automotive industry. Instead there 
are a number of bilateral agreements between partners. 
The most important are those between Argentina and 
Brazil, which between them account for almost 100% 
of automotive production in mercosur. These countries 
signed a special trade agreement for the automotive 
sector in late 1994. The integration process intensified 
yet further in consequence of a second agreement signed 
in 2000. The purpose of the present paper is to ascertain 
the extent to which the 1994 and 2000 agreements led to 
genuine trade creation and whether they have facilitated 
export market diversification.
This paper seeks to answer the following research 
questions. Is there evidence of trade creation after 1994 
and since 2000? Are there patterns of export market 
diversification after those years? Are these patterns similar 
for Argentina and Brazil? Is diversification occurring at 
the expense of trade within the bloc?1
The methodological approach is based on the concept 
of revealed competitiveness. The paper will analyse the 
extent to which the intensity of “intra-bloc” trade, the 
diversification of exports to “extra-bloc” markets, or 
both, increased in these countries in the years following 
their agreements. A number of databases were merged 
to estimate sectoral gravity models and an unbalanced 
panel of 59,165 worldwide bilateral automotive industry 
trade flows (isic Rev. 2, No. 341) was prepared for the 
period from 1991 to 2005.
Section II, as noted, analyses global and regional 
trends in the industry; section III contextualizes the 
study by describing the main features of the regulatory 
framework and also presents the main production and 
trade statistics for the automotive industry in Argentina 
and Brazil; section IV presents the research questions 
and hypotheses. Section V describes the methodology 
used to test the hypotheses, section VI examines the 
empirical findings and section VII, lastly, presents the 
conclusions.
1  The term “bloc” as used in this article refers to the partnership 
between the two countries.
  This study was enhanced by discussions with Andrés López and 
Gonzalo Varela, and the invaluable assistance of Tim Strawson 
is acknowledged. The usual disclaimers apply. The research was 
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From 1961 to 2005, global car output rose by 337%, 
giving a cumulative annual growth rate of 3%. This 
process of expansion was accompanied by ever-increasing 
concentration in the global automotive market which, 
as already mentioned, is now dominated by a few large 
multinational corporations.
Despite the concentration of the market, the share 
of global output accounted for by the United States has 
been diminishing. The country produced 44% of all 
vehicles in 1961, but by 2005 the figure had dropped 
to 18%. Meanwhile, the global share of other regions 
such as Asia (and China in particular) increased greatly. 
This relocation of production could be explained by the 
emergence and intensification of global and regional 
corporate strategies.
The 1990s saw the appearance of global trends in 
the industry driven essentially by the goal of enhancing 
competitiveness by cutting costs and increasing product 
variety. These trends, which led to a reorganization of the 
value chain and the internationalization of production, 
are known as “commonalization”, “modularization” and 
“global sourcing”.3
“Commonalization” consists in the use of common 
platforms and other mechanical components globally to 
concentrate most design activities in few locations.4 It 
creates new possibilities for increasing scale (especially 
in design and development) and for economies of scope, 
since with few alterations different models and versions 
can be produced on the same platforms. Design activities 
are usually located in core countries and developing 
countries thus tend to adopt a “follow design” strategy, 
meaning that they are rarely involved in the design of 
their own models, instead adopting models designed 
centrally by the parent corporation.5 Nonetheless, firms’ 
regional strategies do create some windows of opportunity 
2  This section is largely based on Arza and López (2008a).
3  See Humphrey, Lecler and Salerno (2000) for further details on 
these global strategies.
4  The concept of the platform includes the chassis, suspension, 
transmission and engine compartment, among other elements (Bastos 
Tigre and others, 1999).
5  This marks a clear shift away from the technical and production logic 
of the 1960s and 1970s, when the different models were produced and 
sold in national and regional markets with major adaptive innovations 
introduced by various subsidiaries around the world (Cimoli and 
Katz, 2001).
for design activities by developing-country subsidiaries, 
especially when promoted by regional policies (see 
Ciravegna, 2003, for the case of Fiat-Brazil).
“Modularization” entails a shift in automotive 
production architecture away from assembly of parts 
towards assembly of subsystems. The production of 
subsystems may be outsourced and certain special suppliers 
(sometimes called mega-suppliers) may produce an 
individual module for a complete subsystem (instrument 
panels, seats, gearboxes, doors, etc.). Consequently, 
modularization also entails greater responsibilities 
for mega-suppliers, and automakers have increasingly 
established symbiotic relationships with these as a result. 
For example, it is now common to see suppliers and 
automakers participating in joint engineering activities 
as they cooperate to generate new products, processes 
or both. This ever-closer dependence on suppliers has 
led automakers to forge long-term relationships with 
a smaller number of them, as opposed to encouraging 
competition between a great many potential suppliers, 
which was the strategy applied in earlier decades. Again, 
as suppliers play a greater role in production activities, 
the automakers themselves are specializing more and 
more in design.
“Communalization” and “modularization” have to 
some extent driven the third trend: “global sourcing”. 
Because common components are used to produce 
different models and suppliers are becoming key players 
in automotive production, the automakers usually prefer 
to buy from the same suppliers, irrespective of where 
production is carried out. This means that suppliers, 
especially mega-suppliers and other first-tier suppliers 
(but not second- and third-tier producers of basic 
components), need to globalize.6 Likewise, just-in-time 
technologies sometimes require global suppliers to follow 
automakers to wherever they are producing, a strategy 
6  The term “tier” is used for different groups of vehicle part manufacturers 
ranked by the sophistication of their output and the type of relationship 
they establish with automakers. In the first tier are makers of parts 
incorporating engineering and design processes and often developed 
on a modular basis. In the second tier are component makers that also 
supply the first tier. In the third tier, lastly, are makers of standardized 
components that are inputs for the automotive industry but also for 
other industries.
II
international trends in the automotive industry2
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known in the trade as “follow sourcing”. This strategy 
is limited, however, when large economies of scale are 
required to achieve efficient production.
Broadly speaking, these global trends ought to 
lead automakers to produce globally in order to sell 
worldwide. Nonetheless, the empirical evidence seems 
to show that (i) multinationals concentrate production 
in the region where their headquarters are located 
and (ii) multinationals’ subsidiaries tend to locate 
strategically to supply regional markets in the vicinity 
of their production facilities.
Figure 1 groups the production activities of 
multinationals into four regions: Asia, Europe, North 
America and others. As can be seen, none of them is a 
true global firm if that is defined as a firm carrying out 
at least 20% of its production in each of the three main 
production regions: Asia is still the most important 
production platform for Toyota (64%) and Europe is 
the region where psa Peugeot Citroën (83%), Renault 
(83%), Volkswagen (vw) (71%) and Fiat (65%) do most 
of their manufacturing. General Motors (gm) (56%), 
DaimlerChrysler (54%) and Ford (49%) produce mainly 
in North America.7
This evidence, which highlights the importance 
of the regional as opposed to the purely global level, 
is in accord with a debate being conducted in the 
specialist literature. A number of studies have argued 
that regional strategies predominate over global ones 
in global firms. Regional strategies are said to be more 
profitable, mainly because they are better at exploiting 
economies of scale and scope simultaneously (Rugman 
and Hodgetts, 2001).
7  This evidence is supported by the findings of Rugman and Collinson 
(2004), who analysed 2001 data for the entire automotive complex. 
These authors found that none of the 29 automotive companies 
(including automakers themselves and parts manufacturers) that were 
among the world’s 500 largest could be called a “global firm”, i.e., a 
firm that had at least 20% of its market in each of the regions making 
up the triad (North America, Asia and Europe).
FIGURE 1
internationalization of automotive production, by firm, 2005 
(Shares of total output by region)
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Rugman and Collinson (2004) put forward a 
number of arguments in support of the position that 
the automotive industry is more likely to try to locate 
production in regional markets than to turn into a true 
global industry. In the first place, efficient scale is 
usually achieved at the regional level (Schlie and Yip, 
2000), and this is especially true now that regional 
trade agreements have become more widespread and 
comprehensive (Humphrey and Memedovic, 2003). In 
the second place, demand is often stratified by region 
because of common cultural and environmental patterns 
and similar safety regulations and fuel use, among other 
things. Automakers also prefer their partners in the value 
chain to operate in the same region they produce in.8 This 
is because a well-established network of distribution, 
financial services and after-market services in the region 
increases automakers’ profitability.
To what extent are these changes in the global 
automotive industry affecting production in developing 
countries?
A fundamental point is that, by contrast with the 
situation in the past, protectionist policies in individual 
countries will no longer be a pull factor for investment 
8  This suggests that there is a limit to global sourcing.
in this sector per se and could even have a negative 
effect. This is because, as indicated earlier, the current 
logic of production in the sector has major global and 
regional components, implying a need for a seamless 
trade in cars and parts between subsidiaries of the main 
multinational corporations located around the world 
and between these and their international suppliers. 
However, the prevalence of regional strategies at the 
corporate level does create windows of opportunity for 
a trade policy based on regional agreements.
Several of these agreements have spread around 
the globe. mercosur is an interesting case because, 
other than the Association of South-East Asian Nations 
(asean), it is the only grouping to contain exclusively 
developing countries. Although a full agreement among 
mercosur countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and 
Uruguay) has not yet been achieved for the automotive 
industry, a point that is analysed below, this paper will 
seek to measure the effect of the agreement on its main 
partners (Argentina and Brazil) as regards trade creation 
and export market diversification.
The following section describes changes in the 
regulations pertaining to trade agreements for the 
automobile sector between these countries since the 
1990s and also discusses the evolution of production 
and trade in the Argentine and Brazilian automotive 
industries in the same period.
III
The automotive industry in Argentina and Brazil
mercosur is a major area for the global production and 
sales of the automotive industry. In 2006, this common 
market of countries produced 3 million vehicles and 
ranked seventh internationally among vehicle-producing 
countries, behind Japan (11.5 million), the United States 
(11.3 million), China (7.2 million), Germany (5.8 million), 
the Republic of Korea (3.8 million) and France (3.2 
million). After the mercosur countries came Spain (2.8 
million vehicles), Canada (2.6 million) and Mexico, India 
and the asean countries (2 million apiece).9 In 2006, 
9  Statistics from the International Organization of Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturers.
2.4 million new vehicles were registered in mercosur, 
placing the region eighth in the international ranking. 
Latin America also has a long history of production 
in this industry, beginning in the late 1950s. In many 
cases, subsidiaries in mercosur were pioneers in the 
internationalization strategies of the major firms.
This section will first analyse the evolution of the 
specific rules governing the integration of the automotive 
industry in mercosur, from 1994 until 2006. It will 
provide descriptive statistics to illustrate trade patterns 
in the industry (chiefly regional trade integration and 
export market diversification) in Argentina and Brazil 
during the same period.
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1. mercosur integration for the automotive 
industry10
Where the automotive industry is concerned, the 
integration of the mercosur countries is not yet complete. 
The member countries have not reached agreement on the 
common external tariff, intra-bloc trade rules or rules of 
origin. No common regime has yet been agreed. Instead, 
there is a long series of bilateral agreements. Brazil and 
Argentina signed the first agreement in December 1994 
and the most recent one in June 2008.
The process of integration between Argentina and 
Brazil has gone through four stages:
The first stage was one of “no integration”. Until 
1994, each national regulatory system gave priority to 
protecting its own domestic market. The two countries’ 
industries competed with each other to win new 
international markets.
The second stage can be termed “towards integration”. 
This period ran from 1995 to 2000. In late 1994, the two 
countries signed the Protocol of Ouro Preto, which 
created the institutional basis for mercosur. With some 
modifications, the Latin American Integration Association 
(laia) registered this document as the Twenty-eighth 
Additional Protocol to Economic Complementation 
Agreement 14. It allowed Argentina and Brazil to carry 
on applying national rules pending development of a 
common policy for the automotive sector in mercosur, 
planned for 2000. The expectation was that the common 
policy would establish free trade within mercosur, 
consensus would be reached on the common external 
tariff and national incentives that distorted regional 
competition would be abolished. Consequently, while 
work on a common policy went on, Argentina and Brazil 
agreed on the following:
(i) Free trade between them in cars and parts, subject 
to performance requirements laid down by their 
respective national regulatory systems (the imports 
of a partner country had to be offset by exports to 
any destination).
(ii) Car parts imported from mercosur countries, insofar 
as they were offset by exports, were considered 
national for purposes of compliance with the 
maximum imported content standards.
(iii) Specific rules were agreed on trade quotas (set by 
firm) for which no compensation was required. The 
purpose of these quotas was, first, to offset the deficit 
that arose in Argentina between 1991 and 1994 and, 
10  This section is largely based on Arza and López (2008b).
second, to extend tariff preferences exclusively to 
automakers located in either country.
The third stage was one of “deepening integration” 
and ran from 2001 to 2005. The new agreement was signed 
in 2000 and adopted as the Thirty-first Additional Protocol 
to Economic Complementation Agreement 14, in force 
from August that year until 31 December 2005.
This agreement established a common external tariff 
of 35% for motor vehicle imports from third countries 
which were not subject to quotas. For automobiles 
and sport utility vehicles the tariff took effect upon the 
signing of the agreement, while for other automotive 
products there was a tariff schedule that converged at 
35% as indicated in table 1.
Car parts fell into three groups with different tariff 
levels, converging on rates of 14%, 16% and 18%, 
respectively, in 2005 as detailed in table 1. Parts not 
produced locally could be imported by automakers with 
a tariff of just 2%.
Where intra-bloc trade was concerned, from January 
2001 automotive products were subject to 100% tariff 
preference provided that they complied with rules of 
origin (as detailed below) and that the proportion of 
imports and exports in the industry between partners 
did not exceed the trade ratios approved for the bloc. As 
table 1 shows, the coefficients of intra-bloc trade (also 
known as “flex” and defined as the ratio between imports 
and exports) tended towards an easing of restrictions 
on trade within the bloc with a view to achieving free 
trade by 2006.
To benefit from preferential intra-bloc trade, 
automakers would have to include regional content of 
60%. New models were allowed regional content of 
40% the first year and 50% the second, but had to reach 
the 60% figure from the third year of production. One 
of the concerns of Argentina was that this agreement 
might damage its parts and components industry, as 
the Brazilian real was considerably undervalued against 
the Argentine peso. Consequently, the Government of 
Argentina succeeded in introducing a special clause that 
would be applied to subsidiaries located in the country, 
setting a ceiling of 50% for parts and components 
imported from any country until 2003, with this share 
to rise to 60% in 2004 and 65% in 2005.
Lastly, the agreement did away with government 
incentives, as all production carried out with the benefit 
of promotional incentives or support from a government 
body was treated as extra-bloc production (although this 
provision did not apply retrospectively).
The fourth stage was one of “reversing integration”. 
By the end of the period covered by the 2000 agreement, 
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it was clear that the new Argentine Government, in 
office since 2003, did not regard progress towards a 
regional free trade regime as desirable. Consequently, 
a new agreement was signed in June 2006 after lengthy 
negotiations (the Thirty-fifth Additional Protocol to 
Economic Complementation Agreement 14) and remained 
in force until June 2008. This agreement established 
a number of regulations that largely matched those 
of the earlier agreement; changes were introduced in 
intra-bloc trade, however. Instead of bringing about free 
trade, the agreement signed in June 2006 set a more 
restrictive flex coefficient of 1.95, as compared to the 
2.6 applicable in 2005 (see table 1). A new agreement 
was signed in 2008 (Thirty-eighth Additional Protocol 
to Economic Complementation Agreement 14) and is 
valid until 2014. This confirmed that the flex coefficient 
of 1.95 would be valid whenever Argentina had a deficit 
in its automotive trade with Brazil, but that it would 
rise to 2.5 when the opposite occurred (e.g., intra-bloc 
trade is more restricted when deficits affect Argentina). 
Free trade within the bloc is not due to be achieved 
until July 2013.
This study completes the empirical analysis in 2005, 
i.e., prior to the start of the “reversing integration” stage.
Lastly, the regional influence of the mercosur 
automotive industry has been expanding thanks to a variety 
of preferential trade agreements with other countries 
in Latin America since the late 1990s: Chile (1996 and 
2002), Mexico (2003) and the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador (2005). Argentina and 
Brazil have also signed a number of agreements with 
Uruguay since the 1980s; in the context of mercosur 
integration, however, important steps affecting the 
automotive sector were taken first in 1994, then in 2002 
(Brazil) and 2003 (Argentina).
2. Trade patterns of the Argentine and 
Brazilian automotive industry
The automotive sector is often considered to be an 
important pillar of economic and industrial development 
in Argentina and Brazil. The industry has been 
systematically supported by governments with opposing 
views on economic policy. Up to a point, this support 
has been bound up with issues of political economy 
(there have been vested interests throughout the long 
history of production in the sector that make it difficult 
to remove or reduce government support). Nonetheless, 
the economic importance of the sector is undeniable. 
In 2005, the automotive and components industry 
represented 5.3% of gross industrial production by 
value in Argentina and 3.5% of industrial employment, 
while in Brazil the figures were even higher at 10.9% 
and 6.2%, respectively.
The growth in automotive output in Argentina has 
been erratic (see figure 2). The industry produced fewer 
automobiles in 1990 than in 1961. High rates of growth 
were seen in the 1990s, but in 2002 output dropped back 
TABLE 1
Automotive product regulations applying to trade between Argentina and Brazil, 
2000-2006
Year
Tariffs for extra-bloc tradea
Flex coefficient for 
intra-bloca trade between 
Argentina and Brazil 
approved for a 100% 
tariff preference 
Trailers and semitrailers, 
trucks, truck tractors and 
chassis with engines up to 5 
ton load
Buses, car bodies, trucks, 
truck tractors, chassis with 
engines up to 5 ton load
Car parts
I II III
2000 25.0% 18.0% 7.0% 8.0% 9.0% b 
2001 26.7% 20.8% 8.2% 9.3% 10.5% 1.6
2002 28.4% 23.6% 9.3% 10.7% 12.0% 2.0
2003 30.1% 26.4% 10.9% 12.5% 14.0% 2.2
2004 31.8% 29.2% 12.5% 14.3% 16.0% 2.4
2005 33.6% 32.0% 14.0% 16.0% 18.0% 2.6
2006 35.0% 35.0%  c  c  c Free trade
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of the Thirty-first Additional Protocol to Economic Complementation Agreement No. 14, Latin 
American Integration Association (laia).
a The terms “intra-bloc” and “extra-bloc” within the table refer to the partnership between Argentina and Brazil.
b The Additional Protocol mentioned in the source came into effect on 1 August 2000 for tariffs, but the flex came into effect on 1 January 
2001. This provision was operative until 31 December 2005. Consequently, there was no flex in 2000 because intra-bloc trade was not 
regulated for that year.
c Although the regulations explicitly stated that there would be no flex in 2006 (intra-bloc free trade) and that other vehicles would become 
subject to the same tariffs as cars that year (35%), the rules for vehicle parts I, II and III applied only as long as the regulations did (up to 
the end of 2005). Using these regulations as the information source, therefore, it is not possible to complete columns I, II and III for 2006.
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to levels close to those of 1964. This erratic behaviour in 
Argentina as compared to Brazil explains why Brazilian 
car output, similar to Argentina’s until the mid-1960s, 
was six times as great in 2006.
The two countries also differ greatly in export 
performance (see figure 3). Not until 2005 did Argentina’s 
automobile exports catch up with the Brazilian level 
of the early 1990s (about 180,000 units). Brazilian 
exports have carried on growing since then, and in 2006 
Brazil exported 3.6 times as many cars as Argentina 
(see figure 3). Argentine exports increased strongly in 
the 1990s, with a cumulative annual growth rate of 28% 
between 1992 and 2001, but once again the recession 
and crisis reversed the industry’s export performance in 
2002 and 2003. Only in 2004 did exports begin to grow 
significantly again.
Brazil has also been more successful than Argentina 
in penetrating extra-bloc markets. As a comparison of 
figures 4 and 5 reveals, Brazil has managed to diversify 
its export markets more widely than Argentina. Argentina 
began exporting outside mercosur in 2002, but mainly 
to Latin American markets. Brazil, on the other hand, 
ventured into more demanding markets such as Europe 
and North America in the early 1990s. Although these 
markets still account for only a minor share of Brazil’s 
total exports (about 16% in 2005), their economic 
importance should not be downplayed: the number of 
cars exported by Brazil to Europe and North America in 
2005 was only 35% less than Argentina’s total worldwide 
exports the same year.
Figure 6 shows car exports (isic Rev. 2, No. 341) 
from Argentina and Brazil to markets with and without 
preferential trade agreements (i.e., exports to mercosur, 
Chile, Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador and the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela compared with exports to other 
markets). This chart reveals the following:
(i) Intra-bloc trade in mercosur increased substantially 
in 1995, particularly in the case of Argentina.
(ii) The macroeconomic upheaval of 1998-1999 
(recessions in Argentina and Brazil) and 2001-
2002 (crisis in Argentina) had a negative impact 
on intra-bloc trade.11
(iii) Mexico and Chile became important markets for 
Argentina, but even more so for Brazil, around the 
2000-2003 period.
(iv) Colombia, Ecuador and the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela are not major markets for Argentina.
(v) Other markets without preferential trade agreements 
have always been very important for Brazilian 
exports and cautiously began to take exports from 
Argentina in 2004-2005.
11  Intra-bloc trade is actually very elastic relative to gross domestic 
product (gdp) in Argentina (export elasticity relative to gdp is about 7 
for Argentine exports and about 6 for Brazilian exports), but is fairly 
inelastic relative to gdp in Brazil.
FIGURE 2
Argentina and Brazil: increase in car production, 1959-2006
(Thousands of units)
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of data from the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association (adefa) and the National Association 
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FIGURE 3
Argentina and Brazil: total exports in the automotive sector, 1990-2006
(Units)
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of data from the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association (adefa) in Argentina and the National 
















































































Brazil: total automotive sector exports, by destination, 1991-2005
(Millions of 2000 dollars)
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FIGURE 5
Argentina: total automotive sector exports, by destination, 1991-2005
(Millions of 2000 dollars)








































































































































































































































































































































Argentina and Brazil: exports of automobiles to markets with and without 
preferential trade agreements, 1991-2005
(Millions of 2000 dollars)
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Figure 7 shows the total number of markets exported 
to by Argentina and Brazil since 1991. As can be seen, 
Argentina exported automobiles to just 12 markets in 
1991, but by 2005 this figure had quintupled to 64 markets. 
Brazil was already exporting to many more markets in 
1991 (93), and in 2005 the figure reached 130. During 
the “deepening integration” stage, both countries broke 
their trends and reached a much larger number of markets 
than before (Argentina in 2001 and Brazil in 2002).
However, market diversification means not just 
entering new markets but also exporting at similar levels 
to all of them. In fact, in 2005 some 40% of Argentine 
automotive exports went to just one country, Brazil, while 
28% of all Brazilian exports went to Argentina that year. 
In other words, the quantities sold to each market were far 
from balanced, especially in the case of Argentina. This 
aspect of diversification is represented by an equivalent 









where Fj is the share of total Argentine or Brazilian 
exports going to each market j. The index has a minimum 
value of 1 when all the exports of Argentina or Brazil 
are sold to a single market. Otherwise, the equivalent 
index evaluates diversification in terms of the number of 
markets with equal export shares. For example, Figure 8 
shows that export diversification for Argentina in 2005 is 
equivalent to the diversification of a country that exports 
equal shares of exports to four markets.12
Figure 8 also shows that the level of diversification 
was roughly stable in Argentina until 2001. In the 1991-
1994 period (the “no integration” stage), the index stood 
at around 1.5. It was somewhat lower (1.2) in the 1995-
2000 period (the “towards integration” stage) before 
climbing to about 3.1 in 2001-2005 (the “deepening 
integration” stage). In other words, Argentina’s exports 
were largely confined to Brazil before and after the first 
agreement; during the “deepening integration” stage, 
however, the industry reached new markets, especially 
Chile and Mexico (see figure 6).
12  The absolute number of the equivalent index F is determined by the 
total number of markets exported to by each country. Thus, as Brazil 
exports to more markets, it is expected to have a larger equivalent 
index. The index could have been standardized by the total number of 
markets, but the idea was to account not only for equal shares across 
markets but also for the number of markets each country reached.
FIGURE 7
Argentina and Brazil: export markets, 1991-2005
(Number of markets)

















1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Brazil Argentina
140
mERCosuR As An ExPoRT PLATFoRm FoR ThE AuTomoTIVE IndusTRy  •  VALERIA ARzA
C E P A L  R E V I E W  1 0 3  •  A P R I L  2 0 1 1
In Brazil, conversely, diversification diminished 
sharply after the first agreement (during the “towards 
integration” phase). The Argentine market began to 
be the priority then. In 1991, for example, 12% of 
Brazilian exports went to Argentina and 12% to Chile. 
In 1996, exports to Argentina represented almost 41% 
of the total, while exports to Chile had held steady at 
about 12%. Beginning in 1997, however, the share of 
Argentina declined as Brazil penetrated new markets. 
The diversification index consequently rose. In 2005, 
Brazil attained an equivalent index value of around 7, 
which was still below the 1991 value of about 8, even 
though the country was present in some 25% more 
markets in 2005 than in 1991.
In sum, Brazil outperformed Argentina in output, 
exports and export market diversification. The equivalent 
index suggests that similar proportions of its exports go 
to more markets than is the case with Argentina, which 
continues to rely heavily on markets with preferential 
trade agreements.
There are various factors that account for the 
different patterns of automotive industry development 
in Argentina and in Brazil. First, from a macroeconomic 
point of view, the business climate was more predictable 
in Brazil than in Argentina during the 1989-2005 period 
and Argentine exports (and imports) were much more 
seriously impacted by macroeconomic cycles than 
Brazilian ones. Second, the regulatory system was 
designed and enforced differently, and it involved an 
asymmetric degree of economic aid in each country. 
Although the automobile sector was supported by 
both governments, policy support in Brazil has been 
much more direct and systematic since the origins of 
the industry, with subsidies and soft credits offered by 
federal, provincial and even local government institutions 
(Laplane and Sarti, 2008; Motta Veiga, 2004; Oman, 
2000). In Argentina, conversely, regulations were fairly 
discretionary and sometimes inconsistent, and this 
compounded the unpredictability of macroeconomic 
trends. Furthermore, the government rarely enforced the 
commitments firms had entered into at various times in 
relation, for example, to export performance. In addition, 
there was no concerted political effort to develop the value 
chain, and there was little motivation for subsidiaries to 
carry out innovative activities in the country (see Arza 
and López, 2008c, for further details).
Third, there were structural differences between 
the Argentine and Brazilian industries. The Brazilian 
market was at least four times as large and its industrial 
network was more highly developed. Thus, these locations 
FIGURE 8
Argentina and Brazil: diversification as measured by an equivalent index, 1991-2005
(Index (1-∞)a of equivalent markets)
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of the United Nations Commodity Trade Database (comtrade).
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might have different strategic importance for the global 
automakers. Furthermore, the size of the domestic market 
meant that subsidiaries located in Brazil were historically 
able to achieve greater production scales (and thus 
production efficiency) than subsidiaries in Argentina. 
Humphrey and Oeter (2000, p. 63) argue that a scale in 
excess of 50,000 units can be considered efficient for light 
vehicle assembly. In 1999, 27 different models of light 
vehicles were produced in Argentina, and in no case did 
volume exceed 35,000 units. In Brazil, on the other hand, 
44 models were produced, six of them on an efficient 
scale. In 2006, 17 models were produced in Argentina, two 
of them on an efficient scale, while in Brazil 43 models 
were produced, 15 on an efficient scale. The better use of 
scales in Brazil is connected with the size of its market, 
since an average of 68% of the output of each model was 
sold in the domestic market in 2006; in Argentina, on the 
other hand, the domestic market absorbed an average of 
44% of the output of each model.
The evidence overall points to differences in the 
performance of the automotive industry in Argentina and 
Brazil. However, the purpose of this paper is to ascertain 
the extent to which efforts by firms and governments at 
the regional level might yield increases in competitiveness 
in both countries. Sections IV and V below present the 
research plan employed for this purpose.
IV
research questions and hypotheses
The empirical data considered above seem to indicate 
that intra-bloc trade increased during the period after 
integration began in 1994. In the case of Brazil, this might 
have happened at the expense of extra-bloc trade. In the 
case of Argentina, the descriptive evidence suggests that 
there was genuine trade creation after the first agreement.
Furthermore, both countries’ export markets seem 
to have diversified during the “deepening integration” 
stage (2000-2005). This would support the hypothesis 
that mercosur became a production and export platform 
as a consequence of its regional policies. However, 
while diversification in Argentina began only during this 
period, Brazil evinced a historical pattern of increasing 
diversification that was only briefly interrupted after 
the first agreement (1994). Again, diversification in 
Argentina was largely due to exports to markets with 
which the country had preferential trade agreements, 
whereas this was not the case with Brazil. An alternative 
explanation for export market diversification is that the 
macroeconomic recession in both countries drove them 
to seek new markets for their surplus output.
This paper examines the role of mercosur 
agreements (in this case, between Argentina and Brazil) 
in trade creation and export market diversification.
The research questions are:
Is there any evidence of trade creation after 1994? 
And after 2000? Are there patterns of export market 
diversification after those years? Are these patterns 
similar in Argentina and Brazil? Did diversification 
come at the expense of intra-bloc trade?
The following hypotheses are proposed:
— Hypothesis 1: After the first mercosur agreement 
for the automotive industry (1994), there was trade 
creation in Argentina and Brazil.
— Hypothesis 2: After the second mercosur agreement 
for the automotive industry (2000), there was trade 
creation in Argentina and Brazil.
— Hypothesis 3.1: Brazil, Argentina or both have 
diversified their exports to extra-bloc markets 
since the signing of their second trade agreement 
in 2000.
— Hypothesis 3.2: Diversification since the 2000 trade 
agreement has come at the expense of intra-bloc 
exports (i.e., it has been associated with the contraction 
of demand from the intra-bloc partners owing to the 
macroeconomic recessions in those countries).
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1. The gravity model
This article follows the methodology employed in the 
integration literature to measure trade creation and 
diversion resulting from different institutional agreements 
(Aitken, 1973; Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1997; Braga, 
Safadi and Yeats, 1994; Frankel, 1997; Krueger, 1999; 
Soloaga and Winters, 2001).
Gravity models are inspired by the laws of physics 
relating to the attraction of objects according to their 
mass and the distance between them.




i j  (1)
In trade theory, physical attraction is replaced by 
commercial attraction, which is said to be dependent on 
country size and the distance between countries (G is a 
constant term). Size is defined according to the market size 
of the importer and production capacity of the exporter. 
Distance, in turn, is defined by barriers (institutional and 
geographical) and distance (geographical and cultural). 
Thus, basic gravity models are defined as:
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i = the importing country.
j = the exporting country.
Xij = imports (in thousands of dollars at constant 
2000 prices) to country i from country j (natural 
logarithms).
Yi = gdp of the importing country (in dollars at constant 
2000 prices) (natural logarithms).
N = population of the importing/exporting country 
(natural logarithms).
T = land area of the importing/exporting country 
(natural logarithms).
PCj = production capacity of the exporting country, 
defined as the maximum production of the 
previous five years in dollars at 2000 prices 
(natural logarithms).
ADi = average distance between country i and all its 
export partners, weighted by trade flows (measure 
of remoteness) (natural logarithms).
Dij = distance between country i and country j in 
kilometres (natural logarithms).
Aij = dichotomous variable for adjoining countries i j.
I = dichotomous variable for island countries.
LL = dichotomous variable for landlocked countries.
CLij = dichotomous variable for common language 
between countries i j. This is subdivided into five 
dichotomous variables for different languages 
(Arabic, English, French, Spanish and others).
These models have been expanded to cover other 
aspects, unrelated to size and distance, that affect trade 
between countries, with the use of dichotomous variables 
for trade blocs, for example, or indicators of revealed 
comparative advantage or the evolution of bilateral 
exchange rates, etc. (Filippini and Molini, 2003; Musila, 
2005; Soloaga and Winters, 2001).
The expanded model used in this paper is:
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where the following variables were added to the basic 
equation (2):
RCAij = revealed comparative advantage, defined as 
the ratio between the RCA of country i and the 
RCA of country j. RCAi is defined as the share 
of country i in global car exports relative to 
the share of country i in global exports of all 
traded products. When the indicator is greater 
than 1, country i is said to have a comparative 
advantage in car production. This variable 
attempts to measure the competitiveness ratio 
in car production between the importer and 
the exporter, and is expected to adversely 
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BLOCij = dichotomous variables representing bilateral 
flows in 15 trade blocs (see annex). These 
dummy variables can be seen as institutional 
aids for shortening distances between countries; 
in other words, countries that are in blocs are 
expected to trade more between themselves.
To quantify whether trade creation or diversion 
existed in different circumstances, we employ a set 
of dichotomous variables to identify trade from, to or 
between groups of partners. This methodology was 
originally proposed by Aitken (1973). Since then, a great 
many empirical studies have employed and improved 
on the original methodology.
This article employs the methodology proposed by 
Soloaga and Winters (2001). It will be recalled that the 
objective is to prove whether trade was created after a 
particular event (such as the signing of the 1994 and 2000 
agreements). Three dichotomous variables are proposed 
for this method: a first one identifying the bloc when 
its members import from extra-bloc sources, a second 
one identifying the bloc when it exports to extra-bloc 
destinations, and a third identifying intra-bloc trade. To 
assess whether trade creation took place, the coefficients 
of these variables before and after the event need to be 
compared: there will be trade creation when the increase 
in the third variable is greater than the decrease in the 
first variable; conversely, there will be trade diversion 
when the two effects are similar.
2. Data sources and coverage
The United Nations Commodity Trade Database 
(comtrade) is used. This covers bilateral automotive 
industry trade flows from 1989 to 2006 (isic Rev. 2, 
No. 341). To construct the database used in this study, 
import flows were taken as the first option, with data 
on export flows being used to complete any missing 
information. However, comtrade coverage differs over 
the years, with more missing data in the early years and 
also in the latest period covered. Consequently, the period 
was shortened to include only those years in which the 
data for Argentina and Brazil were reasonably complete 
(1991-2005).13
The following were employed to meet the information 
requirements of the gravity models:
(i) The World Bank Trade, Production and Protection 
Database, which contains information on all the 
independent variables of equation (2) for 100 
13  Trade data produced by the national statistics offices of Argentina and 
Brazil were used to test the completeness of the comtrade database.
countries during the 1970-2004 period, except for 
production capacity.
(ii) The World Bank World Development Indicators, 
to update time-varying information up to 2005.
(iii) The Industrial Statistics Database of the United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization 
(unido), to prepare the production capacity indicator.
(iv) World Trade Organization (wto) statistical data 
sets to identify regional integration agreements.
(v) Legal information from the economic affairs 
ministries of Argentina and Brazil to identify 
preferential trade agreements with third countries 
and other information on regulations affecting the 
automotive industry in the two countries.
Given that information availability differed in 
each database used, an unbalanced data panel of 59,165 
bilateral flows between 1991 and 2005 (between 3,393 
and 4,163 bilateral flows a year) was finally constructed 
to estimate the equations.
3. Testing the hypotheses
To test the hypotheses set out in section IV, the sample 
was divided into three periods. The first period runs from 
1991 to 1994 and represents the “no integration” stage; 
the second period runs from 1995 to 2000 and covers 
the whole of the “towards integration” stage. Lastly, the 
third period runs from 2001 to 2005 and encompasses 
all of the “deepening integration” stage.
Two different models were estimated to test the 
above-mentioned hypotheses.
Model 1
This was used to test hypotheses 1 and 2. Three 
dichotomous variables were developed, as proposed 
by Soloaga and Winters (2001), and were added to 
equation (3).
ARGBRAij is the dichotomous variable identifying 
trade flows between Argentina and Brazil.
ARGBRAi is the dichotomous variable identifying 
other imports into Argentina and Brazil.
ARGBRAj is the dichotomous variable identifying 
exports from Argentina and Brazil to other destinations. 
Hypothesis 1 is true if there is a significant increase 
in the ARGBRAij coefficient between the first and 
second periods that is not offset by a decrease in the 
ARGBRAi coefficient.
Hypothesis 2 is true if there is a significant increase 
in the ARGBRAij coefficient between the second and 
third periods that is not offset by a decrease in the 
ARGBRAi coefficient.
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Model 2
This was used to test hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2. The 
dichotomous variables included were as follows:
ARGBRAij = is the dichotomous variable identifying 
trade flows between Argentina and Brazil.
ARGCHLij = is the dichotomous variable identifying 
trade flows between Argentina and Chile.
ARGMEXij = is the dichotomous variable identifying 
trade flows between Argentina and Mexico.
ARGURYij = is the dichotomous variable identifying 
trade flows between Argentina and Uruguay.
BRACHLij = is the dichotomous variable identifying 
trade flows between Brazil and Chile.
BRAMEXij = is the dichotomous variable identifying 
trade flows between Brazil and Mexico.
BRAURYij = is the dichotomous variable identifying 
trade flows between Brazil and Uruguay.
ARGBRAi = is the dichotomous variable identifying 
all other imports into Argentina and Brazil (excluding 
those already covered by the variables described above, 
such as those from Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Mexico 
and Uruguay).
ARGj = is the dichotomous variable identifying 
other exports from Argentina (not including those going 
to Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay).
BRAj = is the dichotomous variable identifying 
other exports from Brazil (not including those going to 
Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay).
Hypothesis 3.1 will be true if there is a significant 
increase in Argentine or Brazilian exports or both to 
any extra-bloc market (ARGj, ARGCHLij, ARGURYij, 
ARGMEXij, BRAj, BRACHLij, BRAURYij, BRAMEXij) 
between the second and third periods.
Hypothesis 3.2 is true if there is a decline in intra-
bloc trade (ARGBRAij) as large as the combined increase 
in exports to all other markets between the second and 
third periods.
In estimating gravity models 1 and 2, the dependent 
variable was always the natural logarithm of constant 
import value, and the independent variables were those 
mentioned in equation (3). As noted above, the difference 
between models 1 and 2 arises from the different 
disaggregation of export markets for Argentina and 
Brazil. Model 1 treats Argentina and Brazil as a bloc and 
considers not only their intra-bloc trade (ARGBRAij) 
but also their imports from outside the bloc (ARGBRAi) 
and exports outside the bloc (ARGBRAj). Model 2 has a 
twofold purpose. Firstly, it seeks to identify differences 
between the export patterns of Argentina and Brazil and 
therefore includes separate dichotomous variables for each 
of these countries (instead of treating them as a bloc, as 
was done in model 1). Secondly, exports to partners with 
preferential trade agreements are disaggregated, while 
those to partners without preferential trade agreements 
are taken together as a category of exports uncovered 
by such agreements.
The interpretation of the base category (the constant 
term) is the same in both models. It represents the 
worldwide bilateral trade that takes place irrespective 
of the performance of variables included in the models. 
Since there is no difference in the control variables 
included in models 1 and 2 (in the latter the dichotomous 
variable ARGBRAj of model 1 is divided into eight 
new variables: ARGj, BRAj, ARGURYij, ARGCHLij, 
ARGMEXij, BRAURYij, BRACHLij, BRAMEXij), 
none of the coefficients of any of the other variables 
(the constant term included) ought to differ drastically 
from the estimates of models 1 and 2.
4. Estimation methods
There are different alternative methods of estimation 
that could be used to estimate gravity models using 
panel data. The panel employed in this study includes a 
maximum of 78 exporting countries and 103 importing 
countries from all over the world, and covers the 
1991-2005 period. Since trade flows relate to a single 
sector, there could be many bilateral pairs (importing 
country-exporting country) that have no trade flows in 
a particular period. This censored characteristic of the 
database prompted the selection of a Tobit model as a 
first choice of estimation method.
However, the information gaps in the data set 
could be due either to a lack of information (nothing 
is reported when no trade has taken place) or to the 
absence of bilateral relationships between pairs of 
countries. To enhance the robustness of the study and 
avoid listing the value of flows as zero for all missing 
data, only bilateral relationships in which there was a 
bilateral flow in at least three years between 1989 and 
2006 were retained in the database. Thus, a bilateral 
relationship could be assumed to exist in all retained 
cases and a trade flow value of zero was imputed for 
missing data. In all other cases, it was assumed that no 
trading relationship existed and they were left out of the 
analysis. As mentioned, however, the coverage was not 
distributed in the same way across time. In particular, 
there were many countries that reported neither imports 
nor exports in the period before 1994. This implies that 
the relation imputing zero flows to those first years might 
have been biased when, in fact, there may have been 
positive but unreported flows.
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A basic bootstrapping procedure of data resampling 
for periods and bilateral flows yielded inconsistent results 
for Tobit panel estimations. Consistency was only achieved 
when the pre-mercosur period was excluded (i.e., when 
data from 1995 were taken). Given the research question 
posed, centring the analysis on the 1995-2005 period was 
not an option.
Consequently, the next best alternative was to keep 
only positive flows for the analysis, thereby avoiding the 
imputation of zeros. In this way, an ordinary least squares 
(ols) estimate was carried out for the mean value in the 
years falling within the three different periods identified 
in subsection 3 of section V.
VI
Empirical findings
1. robustness of the estimation, goodness of 
fit and gravity variables
Tables 2 and 3 present the results for models 1 and 2, 
respectively. As noted, these two models include a 
different number of dichotomous variables representing 
extra-bloc trade, and the coefficients for dichotomous 
variables relating to the export markets of Argentina and 
Brazil (with subscript j) consequently differ between 
these two models. However, none of the other variables 
included in models 1 and 2 changes significantly. This 
adds to the accuracy of the research design and the 
robustness of the estimation.
In addition, the goodness of fit of models estimated 
for different periods is reasonable, with R2 standing in 
the range of 39% to 51%.
Beginning the analysis with the variables typical of 
gravity models, most of these are found to be generally 
significant and show the right signs. Size and distance 
are the key variables in gravity models. This analysis 
employs three dichotomous variables for size and six 
for distance. The results are generally as expected: size 
affects trade positively and distance does so negatively. 
The gravity model was also extended to include a 
dichotomous variable for the competitiveness of the 
importer’s automotive industry relative to the exporter’s 
(RCAij) and different dichotomous variables for regulatory 
tools (trade blocs) that arguably shorten the distance 
between partners. The results for this group of variables 
will now be examined:
Size
— When the importer’s market size is proxied by 
gdp there is a strong positive effect on trade. This 
effect seems to have increased with time. Market 
size was also proxied by the importing country’s 
population; in this case, however, opposite though 
much weaker results were obtained (countries with 
larger populations import fewer automobiles). This 
may be related to the low purchasing power of highly 
populated countries, where automobiles generally 
cannot be afforded as they are goods with a high 
income elasticity of demand (luxury goods). The 
size of the importer’s territory is only significant 
(and positive, although weak) in the last period 
(2001-2005) analysed here.
— On the exporter’s side, size is proxied by production 
capacity, and this, as expected, has a strong and 
significant positive effect on trade. Similarly, 
the population of the exporting country, another 
dichotomous variable of the exporter’s size, also 
shows a significant and positive, albeit weaker, effect 
on trade. If the exporter’s size is measured by land 
area, however, the opposite result is seen: smaller 
exporters trade more. This apparently anomalous 
finding was to be expected, since automobile 
producers are largely found in small countries of 
Europe and Asia. In 2005, in fact, 60% of producer 
countries, accounting for 53% of global output (not 
including the production of China and India), were 
in Asia and Europe.
Distance
— The main variables representing geographical distance 
are remoteness and the distance in kilometres between 
partners. The latter is significant and displays a 
high coefficient with the right sign; a 1% greater 
distance between partners is associated with 1% 
less trade. This effect seems to have increased over 
time. Remoteness (the average distance from all 
partners) has the opposite effect to the one expected: 
countries tend to import automobiles from far-off 
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TABLE 2
intra-bloc trade: ordinary least squares regression for gravity model 1 estimated for 









Coefficient P-value Significance Coefficient P-value Significance Coefficient P-value Significance
lnY_i 0.36 0.00 *** 0.40 0.00 *** 0.50 0.00 ***
lnPC_j 0.58 0.00 *** 0.63 0.00 *** 0.89 0.00 ***
lnN_i -0.06 0.30  -0.09 0.04 ** -0.11 0.01 *
lnN_j 0.40 0.00 *** 0.41 0.00 *** 0.22 0.00 ***
lnT_i 0.00 0.94  0.01 0.68  0.08 0.01 **
lnT_j -0.42 0.00 *** -0.41 0.00 *** -0.33 0.00 ***
lnAD_ij 0.52 0.00 ** 0.44 0.00 *** 0.26 0.04 *
lnD_ij -0.90 0.00 *** -0.93 0.00 *** -1.02 0.00 ***
A_ij 1.21 0.00 *** 0.67 0.01 ** 0.74 0.00 **
I_i -0.18 0.22  0.07 0.53  -0.01 0.93  
I_ j 0.88 0.00 *** 0.74 0.00 *** 0.94 0.00 ***
LL_i -0.08 0.59  -0.30 0.01 * -0.35 0.00 **
LL_ j -0.27 0.18  -0.31 0.03 * -0.25 0.11  
LSp_ij -0.07 0.76  0.23 0.24  0.47 0.02 *
LEn_ij 0.24 0.24  0.41 0.01 * 0.42 0.02 *
LAr_ij -1.89 0.04 * -1.92 0.00 ** -0.90 0.17  
LFr_ij 0.97 0.05 † 1.05 0.00 ** 1.88 0.00 ***
LOt_ij 2.28 0.00 *** 1.78 0.00 ** 1.46 0.01 **
andean_bloc_ij 0.20 0.80  1.46 0.04 * 1.20 0.09 †
asean_bloc_ij -2.09 0.00 ** -0.89 0.05 † -0.69 0.10  
cacm_bloc_ij 0.86 0.21  1.94 0.00 ** 1.95 0.00 **
caricom_bloc_ij -0.73 0.21  -0.17 0.92  (dropped)   
cemac_bloc_ij -0.16 0.96  -1.37 0.33  -0.22 0.88  
comesa_bloc_ij -0.38 0.53  -0.14 0.78  -0.02 0.97  
eccas_bloc_ij -2.36 0.36  (dropped)   (dropped)   
ecowas_bloc_ij -2.17 0.23  -0.75 0.09 † 0.86 0.14  
efta_bloc_ij 1.73 0.24  1.15 0.23  1.49 0.13  
eu_25_bloc_ij 2.89 0.00 *** 2.89 0.00 *** 2.22 0.00 ***
gcc_bloc_ij (dropped)   (dropped)   (dropped)   
nafta_bloc_ij 5.12 0.00 *** 6.13 0.00 *** 4.93 0.00 ***
sadc_bloc_ij 1.87 0.01 ** 1.39 0.00 *** 1.83 0.00 ***
saarc_bloc_ij -2.37 0.01 ** -1.08 0.12  -0.74 0.33  
waemu_bloc_ij -2.70 0.39  -0.06 0.94  0.55 0.54  
RCA_ij -0.0003 0.00 *** -0.0012 0.00 *** -0.0003 0.00 **
ARGBRA_i 0.39 0.25  0.49 0.08 † -0.30 0.31  
ARGBRA_ j 0.06 0.81  0.17 0.43  0.55 0.01 **
ARGBRA_ij 3.56 0.05 † 5.00 0.00 ** 4.19 0.01 *
Constant -11.21 0.00 *** -12.72 0.00 *** -17.51 0.00 ***
          
N 3 013   4 019   3 752   
Adjusted R2 0.39   0.47   0.51   
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of data from different sources.
† if p < 0.10; * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001.
Notes: Andean: Andean Community. Asean: Association of South-East Asian Nations. Cacm: Central American Common Market. Caricom: 
Caribbean Community. Cemac: Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa. Comesa: Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa. Eccas: Economic Community of Central African States. Ecowas: Economic Community of West African States. Efta: European Free 
Trade Association. Eu: European Union. Gcc: Gulf Cooperation Council. Nafta: North American Free Trade Agreement. Sadc: Southern 
African Development Community. Saarc: South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. Waemu: West African Economic and Monetary 
Union. rca: revealed comparative advantage. argbra: Argentina/Brazil. P-value: probability value.
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TABLE 3
Market diversification: ordinary least squares regression for gravity model 2 









Coefficient P-value Significance Coefficient P-value Significance Coefficient P-value Significance
lnY_i 0.36 0.00 *** 0.40 0.00 *** 0.50 0.00 ***
lnPC_ j 0.58 0.00 *** 0.63 0.00 *** 0.89 0.00 ***
lnN_i -0.05 0.35  -0.09 0.04 ** -0.11 0.01 **
lnN_ j 0.40 0.00 *** 0.41 0.00 *** 0.21 0.00 ***
lnT_i -0.01 0.81  0.01 0.75  0.08 0.01 ***
lnT_ j -0.42 0.00 *** -0.41 0.00 *** -0.33 0.00 ***
lnAD_ij 0.47 0.00 *** 0.41 0.00 *** 0.24 0.06 *
lnD_ij -0.87 0.00 *** -0.91 0.00 *** -1.01 0.00 ***
A_ij 1.08 0.00 *** 0.56 0.02 ** 0.70 0.01 ***
I_i -0.17 0.23  0.08 0.51  -0.01 0.95  
I_ j 0.87 0.00 *** 0.74 0.00 *** 0.93 0.00 ***
LL_i -0.07 0.65  -0.28 0.01 ** -0.35 0.00 ***
LL_ j -0.27 0.19  -0.31 0.03 ** -0.25 0.11  
LSp_ij 0.05 0.84  0.29 0.15  0.47 0.03 **
LEn_ij 0.25 0.22  0.41 0.01 ** 0.42 0.02 **
LAr_ij -1.82 0.04 ** -1.88 0.00 *** -0.89 0.18  
LFr_ij 0.98 0.05 ** 1.06 0.00 *** 1.88 0.00 ***
LOt_ij 2.28 0.00 *** 1.76 0.00 *** 1.47 0.01 ***
andean_bloc_ij 0.21 0.79  1.50 0.03 ** 1.24 0.09 *
asean_bloc_ij -1.99 0.00 *** -0.83 0.07 * -0.66 0.12  
cacm_bloc_ij 0.84 0.22  1.96 0.00 *** 1.98 0.00 ***
caricom_bloc_ij -0.73 0.68  -0.17 0.92  (dropped)   
cemac_bloc_ij -0.02 0.99  -1.22 0.39  -0.17 0.91  
comesa_bloc_ij -0.33 0.58  -0.12 0.81  -0.01 0.98  
eccas_bloc_ij -2.29 0.37  (dropped)   (dropped)   
ecowas_bloc_ij -2.00 0.27  -0.68 0.12  0.89 0.13  
efta_bloc_ij 1.76 0.23  1.15 0.23  1.48 0.13  
eu_25_bloc_ij 2.92 0.00 *** 2.91 0.00 *** 2.22 0.00 ***
gcc_bloc_ij (dropped)   (dropped)   (dropped)   
nafta_bloc_ij 5.25 0.00 *** 6.23 0.00 *** 4.98 0.00 ***
sadc_bloc_ij 1.97 0.01 *** 1.47 0.00 *** 1.86 0.00 ***
saarc_bloc_ij -2.27 0.00 *** -0.99 0.15  -0.70 0.36  
waemu_bloc_ij -2.82 0.37  -0.08 0.92  0.54 0.54  
RCA_ij -0.0003 0.00 *** -0.0012 0.00 *** -0.0003 0.00 ***
ARGBRA_i 0.31 0.38  0.40 0.17  -0.39 0.19  
ARG_ j -1.01 0.02 ** -0.80 0.02 ** 0.12 0.74  
BRA_ j 0.43 0.15  0.59 0.03 ** 0.60 0.03 **
ARGBRA_ij 3.92 0.03 ** 5.43 0.00 *** 4.91 0.00 ***
ARGURY_ij 2.93 0.11  1.76 0.29  0.17 0.92  
ARGCHL_ij 1.29 0.48  1.73 0.30  0.79 0.64  
ARGMEX_ij -2.05 0.26  1.18 0.48  3.36 0.05 **
BRAURY_ij 2.46 0.17  4.08 0.01 ** 2.12 0.21  
BRACHL_ij 2.48 0.17  1.39 0.40  1.64 0.33  
BRAMEX_ij 3.08 0.09 * 3.92 0.02 ** 4.27 0.01 **
Constant -11.03 0.00 *** -12.52 0.00 *** -17.34 0.00 ***
N 3 013   4 019   3 752   
Adjusted R2 0.39   0.48   0.51   
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of data from different sources.
† if p < 0.10; * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001.
Notes: Andean: Andean Community. Asean: Association of South-East Asian Nations. Cacm: Central American Common Market. Caricom: 
Caribbean Community. Cemac: Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa. Comesa: Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa. Eccas: Economic Community of Central African States. Ecowas: Economic Community of West African States. Efta: European Free 
Trade Association. Eu: European Union. Gcc: Gulf Cooperation Council. Nafta: North American Free Trade Agreement. Sadc: Southern 
African Development Community. Saarc: South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. Waemu: West African Economic and Monetary 
Union. rca: revealed comparative advantage. argbra: Argentina/Brazil. argury: Argentina/Uruguay. argchl: Argentina/Chile. argmex: 
Argentina/Mexico. braury: Brazil/Uruguay. brachl: Brazil/Chile. bramex: Brazil/Mexico. P-value: probability value.
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partners. This could be because the United States 
and Japan, two countries that are fairly remote 
from the rest of the world, have highly diversified 
markets and large shares of global exports.14 The 
dichotomous variable for cultural distance was 
language. Sharing the same language became an 
important factor in trade only during the latest 
period (countries where Arabic is spoken were an 
exception, probably because of their very low share 
of automobile output).
Revealed comparative advantage
— These variables have the expected negative signs; 
the more competitive the importer is relative to the 
exporter, the lower the level of trade between them.
Blocs
— Most of the significant dichotomous variables have 
the expected signs, indicating that the regulations 
of trade agreements have helped to shorten 
distances.15
2. Evidence in support of the paper’s main 
hypotheses
As can be seen in table 2, Argentina and Brazil traded 
more with each other than predicted by the expanded 
version of the gravity model (ARGBRAij is significant 
and positive in all periods). More precisely, in the 1991-
1994 period Argentina and Brazil traded 34 times as much 
as would be expected from the gravity model.16 In the 
second (“towards integration”) stage, however, after the 
two countries signed their trade agreement in December 
1994, there was 147 times as much trade between them 
as predicted by the gravity model. In other words, the 
agreement seems to have had a very large effect on 
14  Furthermore, this coefficient changes sign if zero values are included 
in the Tobit models. Remoteness thus seems to have a negative effect 
on the creation of new bilateral relationships, but not necessarily on 
the intensification of trade between established partners.
15  The only exception is the bloc of asean countries, which seem to 
have traded less with one another than predicted by the gravity model, 
especially in the first two periods. This finding seems to be due to two 
factors. First, the bloc’s trade deficit in those years was over 100% 
(between them, the countries imported more than twice as much as 
they exported), meaning that most imports came from outside the 
bloc. Second, the main producers in asean (Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Thailand) exported mainly to destinations outside the bloc.
16  Because the model was estimated in logarithms, the effect of the 
dichotomous variable is given by the formula: =(exp(dichotomous 
variable coefficient)-1*100 (if expressed as a percentage). In the case 
above, =(exp(3.56)-1)=34.
intra-bloc trade.17 In the third stage (“deepening 
integration”), intra-bloc trade was lower than in the 
previous period; even so, Argentina and Brazil traded 65 
times as much as predicted by the gravity model.
Figure 9 shows the evolution of the coefficients of 
intra-bloc trade between Argentina and Brazil when the 
gravity model equations are estimated by year. As can be 
seen, trade between these two countries began to expand 
in the early 1990s; however, it was not until after the 
first agreement (in late 1994) that Argentina and Brazil 
traded a significantly greater volume than would have 
been expected from the gravity equation. This effect was 
most pronounced in the 1996-1998 period. In 1999, the 
Brazilian recession may have diverted Argentine exports 
to other destinations; a decline in intra-bloc trade was 
then observed at the time of the Argentine crisis in 2002. 
These macroeconomic factors may explain which the 
second agreement signed in 2000, when integration 
between Argentina and Brazil was deepened, did not 
increase intra-bloc trade as expected.
Thus, the evidence seems to refute hypothesis 2 
but not hypothesis 1. To conclude that there was trade 
creation after the 1994 agreement, however, it is necessary 
to determine whether the increase in the intra-bloc trade 
coefficient offset the decrease in the extra-bloc trade 
coefficient, as measured by the variable ARGBRAi. Table 
2 shows that there was no decline in extra-bloc trade after 
1994 and that hypothesis 1 therefore cannot be rejected. 
In other words, trade was created for Argentina and Brazil 
after the first agreement in 1994. This did not happen 
after the agreement signed in 2000 (i.e., the evidence 
supports hypothesis 1 but not hypothesis 2).
Exports to other destinations during “deepening 
integration” (stage 3) were 73% (=exp(0.55)-1)*100) 
higher than anticipated from the gravity model. In 
stages 1 and 2, these countries exported only about as 
much to other destinations as would be expected from 
the gravity model (i.e., the ARGBRAj coefficients were 
not significant). The significance of the ARGBRAj 
coefficient in stage 3 seems to indicate that extra-bloc 
markets were particularly important for the exports of 
Argentina and Brazil during the “deepening integration” 
stage. However, the difference between this coefficient 
and those of stages 1 and 2 is not significant. Although 
this might be explained statistically by the large standard 
deviation of the coefficients in the first and second periods, 
it cannot be categorically stated that Argentina, Brazil 
or both diversified their export markets after the 2000 
17  The difference in the coefficient for ARGBRAij between the first 
and second periods is significant (p-value of 0.06).
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agreement (either in consequence of the change of regime 
that initiated the “deepening integration” stage or because 
of macroeconomic upheaval). Consequently, while extra-
bloc markets became quite important in this period, the 
available evidence seems to refute hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2 
when Argentina and Brazil are treated as a single bloc.
The information presented in table 3 helps to 
differentiate the export strategies followed separately 
by Argentina and Brazil, and can thus be used to test 
hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2 for each country. Table 3 shows 
the results of the model 2 estimates, concentrating 
particularly on markets that have been recently supported 
by trade regulation.
Among markets with preferential trade agreements, 
Mexico is the only one to have become an increasingly 
important partner for both Argentina and Brazil. First, 
Argentine exports to Mexico were significantly different 
from the gravity predictions in period 3. Second, Brazilian 
exports to Mexico were always higher than expected 
from the gravity model and increased further over time. 
Differences in coefficients between time periods are not 
significant in either country.
The trade of Chile with Argentina and Brazil was 
no greater than would be expected from the gravity 
model. That of Uruguay was greater than predicted by 
the gravity model only in the case of Brazil after the 
signing of the 1994 agreement.
As for Argentina and Brazil’s other export markets, 
in stages 1 and 2 Argentina can be seen to have exported 
less than predicted by the gravity model to other markets 
(ARGj) with which it did not have preferential trade 
agreements as specified by the gravity model. In stage 3, 
the coefficient was no longer negative, but nor was it 
significant. Brazil, on the other hand, displays positive 
and significant coefficients for BRAj in stages 2 and 3, 
reflecting more intensive use of strategies to diversify 
beyond markets with preferential trade agreements. 
Furthermore, an exercise similar to this one but carried 
out on the model 1 exercise (for example, by dividing 
the dichotomous variable ARGBRAj into ARGj and 
BRAj) yields the same results.
In sum, regarding assumption 3.1 (export 
diversification increased in stage 3), the evidence 
seems to show that:
(i) Argentina exported more to Mexico in this period 
than predicted by the gravity model, but not in 
earlier periods.
(ii) Brazil always exported more to Mexico than would 
be expected from the gravity model, and this effect 
tended to increase over time.
(iii) Brazil exported more than predicted by the gravity 
model to markets without preferential trade 
agreements in stages 2 and 3. The differences 
between periods were not significant, however, 
which means that these effects cannot be associated 
with any particular change in 2000.
To sum up, there appears to be no evidence of 
greater trade diversification after 2000, whether because 
of the signing of the 2000 agreements or the recession in 
mercosur. Consequently, hypothesis 3, in both its 3.1 
and 3.2 forms, also needs to be rejected when Argentina 
and Brazil are analysed separately. Hypothesis 3.1 
(e.g., diversification into new markets after the 2000 
agreement) is rejected because exports to extra-bloc 
markets were not systematically higher in stage 3 than 
in stage 2. Hypothesis 3.2 (i.e., diversification came at 
the expense of intra-bloc trade) is rejected on the same 
grounds as hypothesis 3.1 and also because intra-bloc 
FIGURE 9
Coefficients for ArGBrA_ij dichotomous variables in ordinary least squares 
estimations of the gravity equation per year, 1990-2005
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trade (ARGBRAij) did not change significantly between 
stages 2 and 3.
Lastly, while hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2 have been 
rejected, there is some evidence for the growing 
importance of Mexico vis-à-vis intra-bloc trade. Intra-
bloc trade in stage 2 was considerably greater than that 
between Argentina or Brazil and any other partner with 
a preferential trade agreement, including Mexico. In 
stage 3, however, although the intra-bloc trade results 
were greater than those for any other partnership, the 
intra-bloc coefficient is not much different from the trade 
coefficient between Mexico and Argentina or between 
Mexico and Brazil. In other words, Mexico seemed to 
increase in importance (relative to intra-bloc trade) as 
an export market for Argentina and also for Brazil. This 
is not the case with Uruguay, a partner whose relative 
importance declined, or with Chile, whose relative 
importance was roughly stable over time.
VII
Conclusions
The trend towards internationalization of the global 
automotive industry has intensified since the 1990s 
and includes global and regional strategies. Regional 
strategies are said to be more efficient because the trade-
off between efficient scale and product differentiation 
is more balanced.
mercosur has a long history as a location for 
automotive production. For example, some subsidiaries 
of multinational corporations began producing earlier 
in the region than in more developed places. mercosur 
is now a major area in terms of its share of both global 
output and exports.
However, the region has not yet achieved full 
integration for the industry. The main reason for the 
lack of a full agreement in the automotive industry 
is that the members of mercosur have not reached a 
consensus on the common external tariff (Argentina and 
Brazil prefer higher tariffs, while Uruguay and Paraguay 
prefer lower tariffs).
This is now one of the few sectors in which Argentine-
Brazilian trade is administered by a series of agreements 
entailing different degrees of intervention. The first of 
these agreements was reached in 1994 and began what 
this article has called the “towards integration” stage. The 
second agreement, signed in 2000, was more committed 
to regional integration and established the beginning of 
the “deepening integration” stage. In 2006 and again in 
2008, however, agreements were signed that set back 
intra-bloc integration in one way or another (“reversing 
integration” stage). Intra-bloc free trade was postponed 
until 2013, chiefly owing to Argentine concerns about 
competition from Brazil.
All these agreements tended to favour strategies of 
complementation within the multinational corporations 
located in the two countries. To some extent this was 
achieved during the “deepening” stage, as discussed by 
Arza and López (2008b) when studying the Argentine case.
The purpose of this paper was to analyse the 
extent to which mercosur (defined as Argentina and 
Brazil only) has been turned into an export platform for 
automotive production. More specifically, the objective 
was to examine whether trade was created after the trade 
agreements of late 1994 and 2000, and whether the two 
countries diversified their exports to other markets during 
the “deepening integration” stage (2000-2005).
The methodology proposed (estimation of an 
expanded gravity equation) required the construction of 
a large database with information from different sources. 
Once all the variables needed for the estimation had been 
assembled, an unbalanced database was created with a 
maximum of 78 exporting countries and 103 importing 
countries, with measurements of trade flows in the 1991-
2005 period. To meet the research objective, the sample 
was divided into three periods (before and after the 1994 
and 2000 trade agreements) and two different versions 
of the gravity model were estimated. The difference 
between the models is that the second disaggregates 
extra-bloc exports more extensively.
The conclusion from the empirical analysis was 
that genuine trade creation did take place after the 1994 
agreement. Argentina and Brazil traded more with each 
other than predicted by the gravity model. Furthermore, 
intra-bloc trade increased significantly after 1994 (i.e., 
between periods 1 and 2), without harming extra-bloc 
trade. Possibly as a result of the recession in Brazil (and 
Argentina) in 1998-1999 and the Argentine crisis of 
2001-2002, however, the 2000 agreement did not lead 
to a large rise in intra-bloc trade.
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The descriptive evidence shows that after the signing 
of the second agreement in 2000 (during the “deepening 
integration” stage), the region apparently exported more 
than before to other destinations. In Brazil, furthermore, 
a more aggressive diversification strategy was applied to 
exports, which expanded beyond the markets covered by 
preferential trade agreements. This may be because the 
bloc was turning into an export platform following the 
enhanced agreement between Argentina and Brazil in 
2000, or because both countries suffered macroeconomic 
upheavals in those years and so had to look for extra-
bloc markets. While the econometric estimates show that 
extra-bloc trade (Argentina’s mainly going to Mexico 
but Brazil’s also to countries without preferential trade 
agreements) was greater than predicted by the gravity 
model and actually increased in the period, this rise was 
not statistically significant.
To sum up, there is evidence of trade creation after 
the 1994 agreement, although the same did not happen 
after the agreement signed in 2000. Trade creation is 
accounted for mainly by the rise in intra-bloc trade. 
Although the export share of countries outside the bloc 
progressively increased, there is not enough evidence to 
claim that Argentina or Brazil succeeded in systematically 
increasing their access to extra-bloc markets after the 
signing of the integration agreements. In other words, 
to judge by the evidence gathered up to 2005, the 2000 
mercosur agreements were not successful at that time 




Selected regional integration agreements
Andean Community: Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Plurinational State of Bolivia.
asean (Association of South-East Asian 
Nations):
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam.
cacm (Central American Common 
Market):
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.
caricom (Caribbean Community): Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, 
Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago.
cemac (Economic and Monetary 
Community of Central Africa):
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.
comesa (Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa):
Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, 
Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
eccas (Economic Community of Central 
African States):
Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda and São Tomé and Príncipe.
ecowas (Economic Community of West 
African States):
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.
efta (European Free Trade Association): Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.
eu 15 (European Union (15 countries)): Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
eu 25 (European Union (25 countries)): Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
gcc (Gulf Cooperation Council): Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates.
mercosur (Southern Common Market): Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.
nafta (North American Free Trade 
Agreement):
Canada, Mexico and the United States of America.
Preferential Trade Agreement of the 
South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (saarc):
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
Sadc (Southern African Development 
Community):
Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic 
of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
waemu (West African Economic and 
Monetary Union):
Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo.
Source: selected by the author on the basis of World Trade Organization (wto) statistical data.
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